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INTRODUCTION

I.

This appeal presents a purely legal question: would California law apply Idaho’s public
policy against the enforcement 0f a forum selection clause to render the clauses in this case void?

The

district court erred

when

it

answered

that question “yes”

and applied Idaho Code

§ 29-1 10 t0

void forum selection clauses in two contracts that require disputes to be arbitrated in Sacramento
County, California and resolved under California law. The contracts are the Membership Interest
Purchase Agreement (the
for Off—Spec Solutions,

LLC’S (Transportation

LPA) and the Amended and Restated Limited Liability Agreement

LLC

(the

LLC Agreement). They relate to

Transportation Investors,

Investors) purchase 0f a controlling interest in Off—Spec Solutions,

LLC

(Off—Spec) from Daniel Salvador and Christopher Salvador (the Salvadors).

The question presented concerns only
clauses in the

the enforcement of the California

MIPA and the LLC Agreement. The parties

agree,

and the

forum selection

district court

found, that

disputes under the contracts are subject to arbitration and California law applies to determine the

enforceability 0f the clauses.

California law.

Forum

selection clauses are favored

They should be enforced unless

their

and presumed valid under

enforcement would be unreasonable or

subvert the “public policy of the forum.” Unlike federal law under

Shore C0., 407 U.S.

1

(1972)

own public policy and the

(W), California law

solely

substantial rights of its residents.

“public policy 0f the forum,” California

That distinction

is

is

sets this case apart

M/S Bremen

v.

Zapata Oﬂ-

and overly concerned with

its

When California considers the

the forum.

from Cerami-Kote,

10

Inc.

v.

Energywave Corp, 116

Idaho 56, 773 P.2d 1143 (1989) (Cerami-Kote), and T3 Enterprises, Inc.
Systems, Ina, 164 Idaho 738, 435 P.3d 518 (2019)

would apply Idaho public policy

(T_3).

v.

Safeguard Business

Cerami-Kote held that Florida law

set forth in Section 29-1

10 because Florida case law expressly

adopts Bremen’s public policy analysis, which considers whether the enforcement of the forum
selection clause

“would contravene a strong public policy of the forum

Bremen, 407 U.S.

at 15.

T3 held

that

in

which

suit is

brought.”

Texas law would also apply Section 29-1 10 because Texas

case law states that Texas applies the same public policy analysis as Bremen.
California law

is

fundamentally different than Florida and Texas law. California case law

has not expressly adopted Bremen’s public policy analysis 0r otherwise stated that California
considers the public policy of the forum where the suit
selection clause

is

California applies

is

brought to determine

forum

enforceable. Contrary to both the Salvadors and the district court, the fact that

its

own public policy when

also applies the other state’s public policy.

suit is

brought in California does not

such as the Salvadors t0 race t0 an Idaho courthouse
arbitrate in another state

mean

that

it

Cerami-Kote and T3 conﬁrm there must be something

more. Otherwise Section 29-1 10 Will always trump the other

agreement to

if a

and under that

state’s law,

encouraging parties

ﬁrst, nullifying a free

and voluntary

state’s law.

Moreover, the Salvadors have not satisﬁed their substantial burden t0 prove the
enforcement of the MIPA’s and the

The Salvadors contend
and the

that

it is

LLC Agreement’s

more

practical

forum selection clauses

and equitable for

is

unreasonable.

arbitration involving the

MIPA

LLC Agreement to proceed together with an arbitration in Idaho involving employment

agreements (the Employment Agreements) they entered into With Off—Spec. The Employment

11

Agreements govern the Salvadors’ post-sale relationship with Off—Spec as employees and

But under California law, mere inconvenience 0r the prospect of additional expense

ofﬁcers.

not the test 0f unreasonableness.

Any

alleged inconvenience 0f separate arbitrations does not

override the forum selection clauses in the

are separate disputes

MIPA and the LLC Agreement. The two

and must be treated as such,

III

district court’s

(SBIC), L.P.

(w)

compel

Had the

compelled arbitration under the

The

II,

L.P.

(w), and The Central

decision voiding the forum selection provisions in the

arbitration in Idaho.

California.

Fund

(collectively, Appellants) ask the

Agreement and denying Appellants’ motion

Court t0 reverse the

MIPA and the LLC

t0 dismiss the Salvadors’ cross—application to

district court

properly applied California law,

MIPA and the LLC Agreement in Sacramento

parties’ disputes

arbitrations

in accord with the parties” agreements.

Transportation Investors, The Central Valley

Valley Fund

is

it

should have

County,

under those contracts should proceed separately in California, as

the parties agreed.

II.

The Salvadors’

factual

STATEMENT OF FACTS

background requires clariﬁcation on a number of points

relating to

the parties, the relevant contracts, and the underlying allegations 0f misconduct. In particular, the

Salvadors conﬂate Appellants With Off—Spec and suggest that Appellants chose the Idaho forum

by seeking

1

to initiate arbitration here.

See Salvadors Br.

1, 8.1

That

is

incorrect. Appellants seek

Appellants use a slightly different citation format than used in their opening brief. The

Clerk’s Record

is

cited as

g In addition, the

parties’

12

opening briefs are cited as

ﬂ

to arbitrate matters involving the

MIPA and the LLC Agreement in California.

Appellants were

only drawn t0 Idaho by the Salvadors’ cross—application to compel arbitration in Idaho.

A.

Transportation Investors, CVF II, CVF III, and Off—Spec are different legal
With different legal relationships t0 the Salvadors.

The Salvadors blend together four

CVF

II,

CVF

III,

and Off—Spec

overlap between them.” Id. at
“Investors.” Id. at

1, 3.

—

3.

distinct corporate entities

— Transportation

as essentially “a single party because there

The Salvadors

Investors,

a signiﬁcant

refer t0 all four entities collectively as the

In truth, Transportation Investors,

separate legal entities with distinct roles in

is

entities,

two separate

CVF

II,

CVF

III,

and Off—Spec are

arbitrations.

In particular, Transportation Investors and Off—Spec remain different corporate entities.

See R. 205-06. Through the MIPA, Transportation Investors purchased a maj ority

interest in Off-

Spec from the Salvadors. R. 228, 867. Transportation Investors and the Salvadors also entered
into the

LLC Agreement,

an operating agreement for Off—Spec. R. 369, 867.

Transportation Investors that

0f the MIPA. R. 476-85, 867.
into the

demanded

was

arbitration against the Salvadors in California for breach

And it was

Employment Agreements With

It

Off—Spec, not Transportation Investors, that entered

the Salvadors, R. 21, 38, 867, and

demanded and then

applied to compel arbitration related t0 those contracts in Idaho, R. 60-70, 8-9, 867.

CVF

II

and

CVF

and identiﬁed as such

LLC Agreement,

III

in the

or the

loaned Off—Spec

MIPA. See

money and

are afﬁliates 0f Transportation Investors

R. 228 (Recital C).

They

are not parties t0 the

Employment Agreements and never contracted With

the

the Salvadors. See

R. 228, 369, 21, 38. They are only involved in this Idaho action because the Salvadors

13

MIPA,

named

them

compel

in their cross-application t0

arbitration, relying

on pierce-the-corporate-veil 0r

alter-ego theories. R. 206, 217.

The Salvadors’

cross—application also interj ects alleged breaches of the

LLC Agreement by Transportation Investors

MIPA and the

and Off—Spec and related breaches. R. 212-15. In

addition, the Salvadors allege that Off—Spec violated the Idaho

Wage Claim Act,

45-601, et seq. R. 21 1-12. After the Salvadors ﬁled their cross—application,

CVF

Idaho Code §

and

II

joined Transportation Investors in petitioning for arbitration in California under the
the

LLC Agreement.

By conﬂating the parties,
the

the Salvadors also conﬂate the

Employment Agreements and the various

claims arising under (1) the

and the Idaho

III

MIPA and

R. 746, 748.

The alleged underlying misconduct at issue in this appeal arises under
and the LLC Agreement, not the Employment Agreements.

B.

CVF

MIPA,

the

the

MIPA

LLC Agreement,

and

disputes related to each contract, despite different

MIPA and the LLC Agreement and (2) the Employment Agreements

Wage Claim Act.

There are important distinctions between

(1) the

MIPA and the

LLC Agreement and (2) the Employment Agreements.
The Employment Agreements concern
employees and ofﬁcers 0f Off—Spec and led

the Salvadors’ alleged post-sale conduct as

t0 Off—Spec’s arbitration

demand

in Idaho.

See R.

60-70. Those contracts also require disputes between the parties t0 be arbitrated and have
California forum selection clauses but Idaho choice-of—law provisions. R. 26-27 (§§ 8.2, 8.5,

8.6),

43-44 (§§

8.2, 8.5, 8.6),

870-71. Because they are governed by Idaho law, Off—Spec sought

arbitration in Idaho, recognizing the parties’

forum selection

14

is

void under Idaho Code § 29-1 10.

See R. 12-16, 871. The

district court

t0 arbitrate all disputes arising

The

agreed with Off—Spec’s assessment and ordered the parties

from the Employment Agreements

in Idaho. R. 871-74.

MIPA and the LLC Agreement are different. They also require arbitration, but have

California choice-of—law provisions and select Sacramento County, California as the forum for

any disputes. R. 283-84

(§ 13.2),

288

Alleged misconduct and breach of the

Spec and gave

(§ 13.14),

427-28 (§§ 19.19, 1920.2), 870-71, 874.

MIPA relate to

rise to Transportation Investors’

Transportation Investors’ purchase of Off-

demand

for arbitration in California. R. 483-85,

786-87. The Salvadors’ cross—application broadens those issues, alleging breaches of the

and the

LLC Agreement and implicating CVF

petition for arbitration

II,

CVF

III,

MIPA

and Off—Spec, Which led Appellants

to

under both contracts in California. R. 207-08, 212-15, 748-753.

A summary of the arbitration demands and applications are provided in the Timeline of
Arbitration

Demands and Applications above

matters involving the

(at p. 9). In short,

Appellants seek t0 arbitrate

MIPA and the LLC Agreement and the purchase

and

sale

of Off—Spec in

California. R. 476-85, 205-17, 746-53. Separately, Off—Spec, not Appellants, sought t0

arbitration in Idaho

compel

0n post-sale employment matters under the Employment Agreements. Only

the enforcement of the

forum selection clauses under the

MIPA and the LLC Agreement are at

issue in this appeal. See R. 875-82.

III.

The Salvadors maintain
enforceability of the

REPLY ARGUMENT

that Appellants

forum selection clauses

and the Employment Agreements, 0n the

have taken inconsistent positions regarding the

in the

MIPA and the LLC Agreement,

other. Salvadors Br. 13.

15

That

is

0n one hand,

not true. Appellants

Employment Agreements have

recognize that the

the application of Idaho law, speciﬁcally Idaho

selection clauses. See R. 873.

California forum selection clauses but require

Code

29-1 10, Which invalidates those forum

Mandating the application of California law, the

LLC Agreement are different and do not give rise to
A.

§

MIPA and the

Section 29-1 10.

The district court erred in ﬁnding California law would apply Idaho law
forum selection clauses 0f the MIPA and the LLC Agreement.
1.

California law does not recognize Bremen’s rule that a
is

unenforceable

the
a.

forum

in

forum

t0 void the

selection clause

enforcement would contravene a strong public policy 0f

if

which

suit is

brought.

California has not adopted Bremen’s public policy analysis.

Appellants explained in their opening brief (at pp. 14-15) that forum selection clauses are
favored and presumed valid under California law. Such clauses Will be upheld unless the party
seeking to defeat the clause demonstrates

forum selected

is

its

i.e.,

if the

unavailable 0r unable t0 accomplish substantial justice to the cause of action.

That rule was announced in Smith, Valentino

1209 (Cal. 1976)

enforcement would be unreasonable,

(Sm_ith)

(“No

& Smith, Inc.

v.

Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206,

satisfying reason of public policy has

been suggested

why

enforcement should be denied a forum selection clause appearing in a contract entered into freely

and voluntarily by parties

Who have

negotiated at arm’s length”).

Appellants also explained that the Smith court noted

modern trend” favoring

its

holding was “in accord with the

enforceability of forum selection clauses and cited,

Bremen. Appellants Br. 21-22. The Salvadors maintain
under California law, particularly in
should be held unenforceable

if

its

that

Bremen has

among

other cases,

additional signiﬁcance

statement that a “contractual choice-of—forum clause

enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the
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forum
U.S.

in

which

at 15.

suit is brought,

According

whether declared by

t0 the Salvadors, “California

agreement with Bremen;

it

law does not merely express general

expressly adopts the key holding from Bremen.” Salvadors Br. at 16.

Setting aside for the

moment the truth of that

public policy analysis envisioned

international

by judicial decision.” Bremen, 407

statute or

by Bremen

forum selection clause

is

assertion (spoiler:

a “key holding”

in a maritime proceeding,

is

this

Court addressed Bremen’s public policy

Bremen “carved out an exception allowing
“Bremen provides no authority permitting
maritime law.” Fisk

993-94 (2005)

v.

this

this

not),

doubtﬁll.

Which

and braced by complexities 0f international commerce. See 407 U.S.
maritime case,

it is

is

whether the

Bremen enforced an

governed by federal law

at 13-14, 17-20. In

factor, rejected the

Court t0 apply Idaho Code

§

another

argument

that

29—1 10,” and found

Court to apply Idaho law in place of federal

Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd, 141 Idaho 290, 293-94, 108 P.3d 990,

(Iisk). In Fisk, this

Court explained that the public policy factor was the position

0f the lower appeals court, was limited in scope by the decision’s subsequent analysis, and
ultimately

2

was “a

single sentence pulled out 0f context?” Id.

The Idaho

federal district court

made

similar observations in Peregrine Falcon

LLC v.

WL

4492811 (D. Idaho Aug. 24, 2016),
Piaggio America, Ina, No. 1:15-CV-00568-BLW, 2016
aﬂ’d, 720 F. App’x 863 (9th Cir. 2018). There the court observed that public policy was not an
issue in

Bremen, the Bremen court cited a dissent from the underlying decision

for the

proposition that courts should be careful not t0 overemphasize the strength of the public policy

argument, and Bremen’s “true holding

is

that a court should enforce a

unless the party challenging the clause can ‘clearly

show

that

forum selection clause

enforcement would be

unreasonable and unjust, 0r that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud 0r
overreaching.”’ 2016
449281 1, at *6 (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15).

WL
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Nevertheless,

it is

simply not true that California has expressly adopted Bremen’s

statement that courts must look t0 the public policy of the forum in Which the suit

Even

the district court

the United States

acknowledged

Supreme Court’s

that the California

analysis in

is

brought.

Supreme Court “did not expressly adopt

Bremen.” R. 879. Indeed, the Salvadors do not

(and cannot) cite a single California case that has expressly adopted Bremen’s public policy
analysis.

See Salvadors Br. 16-18. In the end, the Salvadors are

California decisions “routinely rel[y] on

left

Bremen when analyzing

with their contention that

the enforceability of a

forum

selection clause.” Id. at 16.

That includes Cal—State Business Products
(Cal. Ct.

App. 1993)

(1M),

and

CQL

& Services,

Original Products, Inc.

Inc.

v.

v.

Ricoh, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417

National Hockey League

Players’Association, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (QQL). See

Ricoh and

CQL recognize Smith’s

adherence t0 the “modern trend”

0f forum selection clauses that are freely entered
unreasonable

—

is

in accord with

into, so

id.

But

— favoring

at

most,

the enforcement

long as enforcement in not

Bremen. Ricoh, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424-25; CQL, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d

412, 415-16. California’s alignment with the modern trend, by

itself,

does not

mean it has

adopted Bremen’s public policy analysis.
Yet, the Salvadors return time and time again t0 Ricoh and
California law looks t0 the public policy of the

forum

in

which the

CQL

for the proposition that

suit is

brought t0 determine

whether to enforce a forum selection clause. Salvadors Br. 20-22, 24-26. That
Ricoh, the court also stated: “[a]lthough not pertinent here,

we

is

because in

also note that a court Will refuse

t0 enforce a forum-selection clause if this Will bring about a result contrary to the public policy
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0f the forum,” citing Furda

v.

Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 646, 651-52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)

(Furda), and Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425. In turn, citing only t0 Ricoh, the

CQL

court stated: “a forum selection clause Will not be enforced if to d0 so Will bring about a result

contrary to the public policy 0f the forum.” 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416.

From there

the Salvadors conclude, as did the district court (R. 879-81), that

California courts really

meant

t0 say is that California

policy of the forum where the action

law

will, like

wasﬁled to decide whether

clause. Salvadors Br. 16, 20-22, 24-26.

But neither Ricoh nor

stretched as far as the Salvadors and the district court

would

to enforce a

CQL

like.

Bremen, 100k

say

that;

what those

t0 the public

forum selection

they cannot be

In particular, Ricoh

acknowledges the “public policy of the forum” was “not pertinent here,”
forum, and provides n0 further discussion on the issue. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d

fails t0

at

specify which

425.

Moreover, California courts’ consideration of the “public policy 0f the forum” derives

from California law, not Bremen. Thus, Ricoh
Bremen. Furda does not rely 0n Bremen

t0

cites t0

Furda and only then secondarily

ﬁnd n0 compelling public

to

policy reason under

California law to deny the enforcement of a Michigan forum selection clause. 207 Cal. Rptr. at

651-52. Rather

Which did not

it

cites to

rely

Hall

on Bremen

v.

Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 757 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)

either to

deny enforcement of a Nevada forum selection clause

contrary t0 California public policy. Id. at 763.

2d

at

(H_all),

CQL

also relies

as

0n Furda and Hall. 46 Cal. Rptr.

418.

There

is

simply n0 authority t0 support the Salvadors’ assertion that California law has

adopted Bremen’s public policy analysis.
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forum selection clauses Will not be
enforced When enforcement would contravene a strong public policy
0f the forum in which the suit is brought.
California law does not state that

b.

Nor have

California courts stated that forum selection clauses Will not be enforced

enforcement would contravene the public policy 0f the forum
Telling

is

a

Westlaw search

for the phrase the

“forum

in

in

Which

which the

suit is

which reveals only four unpublished California Court of Appeal

suit is brought.

brought” and like phrases,

decisions.

One addressed the

enforcement of forum selection clauses under Colorado law. See Veterinary Mgmt. Servs.,

Imaging Servs., Inc, N0. B180233, 2006
Another recounts the

trial

Quick Bridge Funding,
3525979,

at

The

last

their brief), but

v.

WL 2567997, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2006).

court’s use 0f the phase but does not reach the public policy issue. See

LLC v.

Sw. Fiber Optic Commc’ns-LLC, N0. G054935, 2018

two

results are

WL

law looks
both

unpublished decisions 0n Which the Salvadors rely for authority

to the public policy

cite t0 federal law,

a maritime case governed

the enforceability of the

by

federal

of the forum where the

suit is

ﬁled

not California law. Wollam Int’l Corp.

Decorative Fabrics, Ina, N0. B187650, 2007

2010

Inc.

*2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 23, 2018).

that California

is

When

WL

law and

forum selection

1866769,

at

v.

16-17 0f

New Era

*9 (Cal. Ct. App. June 29, 2007),

thus, like Fisk, applies

clause. Troisi

v.

(at pp.

Bremen when considering

Cannon Equip. Ca, No. G042084,

WL 2061989, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2010), generally looks to California law, but the

portion the Salvadors cite discusses a federal court decision applying federal law, not California

law. (Citing

Swenson

v.

T-Mobile USA, Ina, 415

F.

20

Supp. 2d 1101, 1104 (SD. Cal. 2006).) The

Salvadors’ reliance on a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Gemini Technologies, Inc.

Wesson Corp, 931 F.3d 911 (9th

Cir. 2019), is

v.

Smith

&

misplaced for the same reason. Salvadors Br.

19.

Thus, having not adopted Bremen’s public policy analysis, California courts have not
stated that they will look to the public policy of the

forum where the

suit is

brought

when

considering whether to enforce a forum selection clause.

2.

California courts uniformly 100k t0 California law and public policy to

determine whether a forum selection clause
a.

is

enforceable.

California courts never look to another state’s public policy.

Despite the dearth of support for California’s adoption ofBremen’s public policy
analysis, the Salvadors

still

maintain California law Will consider Idaho public policy t0 decide

whether t0 enforce the forum selection clauses in

this case.

They contend

that Ricoh,

CQL, and

other California decisions consider the “public policy 0f the forum” and what that really

is,

like

Bremen, the public policy of the forum Where the

suit

was

means

ﬁled, because California

Where the cases were brought. Salvadors Br. 21-22. They also argue

that California

considers the “public policy of the forum” in other contractual contexts. Id. at 17.

is

law

And they

suggest that Appellants confuse the “California courts” With “California law” and that even if
“California courts” d0 not 100k t0 another forum’s public policy, “California law” does. Id. at 25.

Those arguments suffer from the same ﬂaws.

It

should be obvious that California courts

apply California law and in doing so have not adopted 0r used any language indicating that they

might 100k

t0 the public policies

selection clause.

0f the other

As Appellants explained

parties contracted for a California

state t0

in their

determine the enforceability 0f a forum

opening brief (at pp. 15-19), whether the

forum or a foreign forum, California courts consider only
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California public policy and the substantive rights of its citizens. That

Online, Inc.

v.

true in

America

Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (Am. Online),

Which observed

would

was

that “California courts Will refuse t0 defer to the selected

substantially diminish the rights 0f California residents in a

forum

if to

d0 so

way that violates our state ’s

public policy.” (Emphasis added.)

It

was

also true in the other cases Appellants cited. See, e.g., Hall, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 763

(“Consequently,

25701

we

hold the choice of Nevada law provision in

[a California statute]

and the public policy

0fthz's state

this

agreement violates section

and for

that reason

deny

enforcement 0f the forum selection clause as unreasonable.” (emphasis added; citation omitted»;
Intershop

Commc’ns

v.

Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 847, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)

(“However, a forum selection clause Will not be enforced

if to

contrary t0 the public policy offhis state.” (emphasis added)).

“[i]n all

do so would bring about a

As even the

result

district court noted,

of these cases, the California courts, applying California law, looked

at its

public

policy.” R. 881.

The Salvadors respond by

stating the obvious:

because California courts were

considering the enforceability of forum selection clauses in California, California law necessarily

looks t0 the public policy of the forum Where the suit

Salvadors Br. 25. But the Salvadors

still

is

brought, just as

Bremen

requires.

have not cited a single case Where a California court

adopted Bremen’s public policy analysis, stated that California law will not enforce a forum
selection clause

When doing

so

would subvert

the public policy of the
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forum where the

suit is

brought, or applied the public policy of the other forum.

Id. at

16-26.

And that leads

to this

Court’s decisions in Cerami-Kote and T3.

Because California does not look to the public policy of the other
state, Cerami-Kote and T3 do not support the district court’s decision.

b.

That California law looks only to California public policy When considering the
enforceability of a

forum selection clause

is

what

sets this case apart

from Cerami-Kote and T3.

Appellants explained in their opening brief (at pp. 23-24) that Florida law

Which the

courts will look to the public policy in

suit is brought; so Will

is

Texas

In Cerami-Kote, the Court explained that Florida expressly adopted

policy analysis. 116 Idaho at 59, 773 P.2d at 1146.
enforceability 0f a

forum selection

As one 0f the

clear that Florida

courts.

Bremen’s public

factors in deciding the

clause, Florida courts consider

Whether enforcement would

“contravene a strong policy enunciated by statute or judicial ﬁat, either in the forum where the
suit

would be brought, or the forum from Which the

citation omitted). Likewise, in T3, the

articulated in

Bremen and

“states that

suit

has been excluded.” Id. (emphasis and

Court explained that Texas case law follows the

forum selection clauses

will not

test

be enforced when

‘enforcement [of the forum selection clause] would contravene a strong public policy of the

forum Where the

suit

was brought.

..’”
.

164 Idaho

at

750, 435 P.3d at 530 (ellipsis in original;

citation omitted).

Again, as shown above, that

is

not the case here. California has not adopted Bremen’s

public policy analysis, like Florida, as in Cerami-Kote.

consider the public policy of the forum where the suit
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Nor has

is

California stated that

brought t0 determine

if a

it

will

forum

selection clause

is

test articulated in

enforceable, like Texas, as in T3. California law simply has not adopted the

Bremen. California law does not compel

its

courts, 0r

We are left then with

California law, t0 consider the laws or policies 0f any other state.
California’s consideration of the “public policy of the forum,” in

The
the suit

is

district court’s

holding

— that

which California

California’s application of its

brought in California means that

it

any other court applying

is

the forum.

own public policy when

Will apply Idaho’s public policy, not

its

own — is

contrary to both California law and Idaho law. Cerami-Kote and T3 require the district court to

consider more than whether California law applies

its

own public policy

because California Will always be the forum in Which the

in California courts,

suit is brought.

decision to be correct, California law must afﬁrmatively state that

it

For the

will 100k t0 the other state’s

public policy to determine the enforceability of the forum selection clause

applying Bremen’s analysis. See Cerami-Kote, 116 Idaho
at

750, 435 P.3d at 530.

It

at 59,

district court’s

773 P.2d

by

at

either adopting or

1146; T3, 164 Idaho

does not.

In ﬁnding that California

would look

t0

Idaho public policy even though n0 California

decision says so, the district court’s holding imposes an arbitrary “ﬁrst—to-ﬁle” rule, whereby the

enforcement of a forum selection clause depends on which party ﬁles

ﬁrst.

See Appellants Br.

26-28. Parties such as the Salvadors could ignore freely made, voluntary, and arm’s—length

agreements t0 arbitrate in another
parties’

state

by simply ﬁling

chosen law and selected forum would 100k t0

enforceability of the clause, the Idaho courts

its

would ﬁnd

24

ﬁrst in an Idaho court.

own public policy t0
that Idaho

Code

§

So long

as the

determine the

29-1 10 would void

it.

Such a holding undermines the teachings 0f Cerami-Kote and T3,

as well as the

“modern trend”

favoring the enforceability of forum selection clauses.

The Salvadors respond by again conﬂating Appellants and Off—Spec
claiming that

it

was

reasonably expect

the “Investors”

all

who ﬁled

as the “Investors,”

ﬁrst in both forums and that the contracting parties

of the disputes to be resolved in a single forum (California). Salvador Br.

30-33. Again, the so-called “Investors” are not a single entity but rather separate entities seeking
to enforce separate contractual rights

under different

the district court’s decision to void the

state laws.

forum selection clauses

Agreement would encourage and reward a race

t0

But more importantly, afﬁrming

in the

MIPA and the LLC

an Idaho courthouse.

In the end, the district court’s reasoning, and the Salvadors’ arguments, fall apart because

there

the

is

n0 support

that California Will look

forum selection clauses of the

back

to Idaho

law

t0 determine the enforceability

of

MIPA and the LLC Agreement. The district court erred in

ﬁnding those clauses void under Section 29-1 10 and must be reversed.
Practical

3.

and equitable factors also support separate arbitrations in
and Idaho, pursuant t0 the parties’ express agreements.

California

As an

alternative argument, the Salvadors contend that a consolidated arbitration

issues surrounding (1) the

is

of the

MIPA and the LLC Agreement and (2) the Employment Agreements

practicable and equitable and avoids expense and a “substantial risk” of contradictory ﬁndings

0r awards. Salvadors Br. 23, 33-36. California and Idaho, like most jurisdictions, disfavor

piecemeal

litigation,

but the Salvadors’ concerns cannot override two

California’s enforcement of forum selection provisions.
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critical considerations in

First, the

Salvadors bear a “substantial burden” t0

show

the

forum selection clauses are

unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. See CQL, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d
fail to

explain

how there

at

415. But they

could be overlap, extra expense, or a risk 0f inconsistent judgments

given these different parties, claims, and contracts. See Salvadors Br. 35-36. Second, the “[m]ere

inconvenience or additional expense
that the plaintiff received

1209

is

not the test of unreasonableness since

it

may be assumed

under the contract consideration for these things.” Smith, 551 P.2d

(citation omitted); see also

0r inconvenience necessitated

Am. Online, 108

by

Cal. Rptr.

litigation in the selected

2d

at

forum

at

713 (“But the additional cost

is

not part of the calculus

when

considering Whether a forum selection clause should be enforced”). Thus, the Court need not
consider the Salvadors’ equitable arguments related to cost and inconvenience.

Even
arbitrations.

if the

Court considers these

As addressed above

obligations under the

post-sale

factors, they actually

weigh

in favor

(at pp. 10-12), the California arbitration Will

MIPA and the LLC Agreement, whereas the Idaho

employment

issues under the

Employment Agreements. The

of separate
address the parties’

arbitration will address

arbitrations cover legally

separate entities with distinct interests, different underlying misconduct, different contracts, and
different state law. Thus, a consolidated arbitration in Idaho would, in reality, consist of two

entirely separate arbitrations. In

there

is

any case,

t0 the extent

any discovery

is

relevant to both disputes,

no reason Why discovery could not be coordinated across the two

arbitrations t0 take

advantage 0f any efﬁciencies.
Here, Transportation Investors and the Salvadors freely and voluntarily contracted for a
California forum for disputes arising under the

MIPA and the LLC Agreement and designated
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California as the choice of law.

compel

application to

California and

may be

It

should not matter that the Salvadors ﬁled their cross-

arbitration in Idaho before Appellants petitioned for arbitration in

inconvenienced by separate arbitrations. Not only

equitable to uphold the forum selection clauses in the

is it fair,

practical,

MIPA and the LLC Agreement,

mandated by California law. The Court should therefore reverse the

and

it is

district court’s decision t0

void the forum selection provisions in those contracts.
B.

Even
the

if

they prevail 0n appeal, the Salvadors are not entitled t0 attorney fees under
12-120(3), the Idaho Wage Claim Act, 0r Idaho

LLC Agreement, Idaho Code §

Code

§ 12-121.

Appellants d0 not seek attorney fees 0n appeal. The Salvadors d0. They request attorney
fees

and costs under Idaho Appellate Rules

(ﬂ) 40 and

(LOP) 54(e)(1), the LLC Agreement, Idaho Code §

41, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure

12-120(3), Idaho

Code

§ 45-615(2),

and

Idaho Code § 12-121. Salvadors Br. 36-41. If the Salvadors are not the prevailing party on
appeal, they are not entitled t0 attorney fees or costs under any 0f those authorities. But even if
the Court

ﬁnds

in their favor,

It

1.

it

should not award attorney fees for the following reasons.

would be premature

t0

award

fees

under I.R.C.P.

54(e)(1), a rule that does

not even apply t0 this Court.

The Salvadors
fees because they

ﬁrst argue that, should they prevail

would be

54(e)(1), a court

may award attorney

54(d)(1)(B)

“When provided

for

0n appeal

district courts

t0 this Court.”

are entitled to attorney

the “prevailing party” under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Salvadors Br. 36-37.

Under Rule

procedure in the

on appeal, they

by any

fees to the prevailing party as

statute 0r contract.”

v.

FIA Card Servs.,
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NA,

in

Rule

But Rule 54(e)(1) “governs the

and magistrate’s divisions of the

Capps

deﬁned

district courts,

not the procedure

149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 583, 590

(2010)

(gm) (Citing I.R.C.P.

1(a)); State

Dep ofHealth
’t

&

Welfare

Slane, 155 Idaho 274,

v.

279, 3 11 P.3d 286, 291 (2013) (Rule 54(6) “d0[es] not apply on appeal”).

Salvadors seek attorney fees 0n appeal under Rule 54(e)(1),

it

T0

the extent the

provides n0 such authority.3

In any event, the Salvadors’ sole basis for “prevailing party” status seems t0 be Rule

54(e)(1).

See Salvadors Br. 37. Under the

When determining Which party is

rule,

it is

premature t0 award attorney fees

a prevailing party, the courts must “consider theﬁnal judgment

0r result of the action.” I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Thus, courts look to

prevailed “in the action,” Which

analysis.”

follows that

LLC v.

Imaging

Ctr.

OfIdaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 814,

(citation omitted).

When an

appeal “resolve[s] some, but not

all,

of the parties” claims,”

premature t0 award fees because “the identity of the prevailing party in

known until proceedings

who

“determined from an overall View, not a claim-by-claim

Advanced Med. Diagnostics,

303 P.3d 171, 173 (2013)
It

is

at this time.

at the trial level are

this case will

complete.” Steel Farms, Inc.

v.

Croft

it is

not be

& Reed, Ina,

154 Idaho 259, 269, 297 P.3d 222, 232 (2012) (reserving determination of any attorney fee

award

for the trial court, after ﬁnal judgment). Here, this appeal involves a threshold procedural

question that does not touch on the substantive issues in the dispute.
attorney fees to the “prevailing party.”

t0 the discretion

3

of the

district court (or arbitrator) after

The Salvadors

forth the procedure for

Any award of attorney

It is

far too early to

fees under Rule 54 should

award
be

left

ﬁnal judgment.

also cite generally t0 I.A.R. 41. Like I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), I.A.R. 41 sets

awarding attorney fees 0n appeal, but does not provide authority t0 award

attorney fees. Capps, 149 Idaho at 744, 240 P.3d at 590.
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The

2.

LLC Agreement does not support an award 0f attorney fees at this time.

Relying 0n I.R.C.P. 54, the Salvadors request attorney fees based 0n the attorney fee
provision in the

LLC Agreement.

under the MIPA. See

id.

36-41.)

status as the “prevailing party”

Salvadors Br. 37. (The Salvadors d0 not seek attorney fees

As just

explained, the Salvadors’ reliance 0n Rule 54 for their

under the

LLC Agreement makes

any award 0f fees before the

ﬁnal judgment or result premature. The Court, however, need not reach that issue because the
Salvadors are not entitled to attorney fees under the

The

LLC Agreement anyhow.

LLC Agreement provides that the prevailing party shall be

entitled t0 reasonable

attorneys’ fees

[i]f the

services of an attorney are required

by any party to secure
Agreement 0r otherwise upon the breach 0r
of any other party t0 this Agreement, or if any judicial

the performance of this
default

remedy 0r

arbitration is necessary t0 enforce 0r interpret

any

provision 0f this Agreement 0r the rights and duties of any Person
in relation thereto.

R. 426-27 (§ 19.1

1).

Notably, the Salvadors only seek attorney fees under this provision 0n two

grounds: (1) because they allege “that the Investors breached the

because they “asked the Idaho

district court to interpret the

LLC Agreement”

LLC Agreement’s

and

(2)

forum selection

clause.” Salvadors Br. 37 (emphases in original).

But

this

appeal does not concern the breach of the

seek to interpret —

i.e.,

ascertain the

LLC Agreement. Nor do the

meaning of — the forum

Salvadors

selection clause; they seek to void

it.

Thus, based 0n their request, to Which they are bound, the Salvadors are not entitled t0 attorney
fees under the plain terms of the

LLC Agreement.
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See Bream

v.

Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 369,

79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003) (Bream) (“If the party bases

its

claim for attorney fees upon a contract,

then the party must likewise identify that portion of the contract upon Which the party relies as
authority for the awarding 0f attorney fees.”).

The Salvadors are not
Code § 12-120(3).

3.

The Salvadors

entitled t0

also request attorney fees

an award 0f attorney

fees

on appeal under Idaho Code

under Idaho

§ 12-120(3),

which

provides for fees t0 the prevailing party in a civil action related to a commercial transaction.

Salvadors Br. 38-39. There are several reasons

Why the

Salvadors are not entitled t0 fees under

Section 12-120(3).

The Salvadors did not support

a.

transaction” With facts, authority,

The Salvadors have not supported
the Court should not consider

repeatedly held that

we

it.

their request

See Bream, 139 Idaho

“commercial
argument.

their claim 0f a
01'

with adequate authority 0r argument, and
at

369, 79 P.3d at 728

will not consider a request for attorney fees

supported by legal authority or argument”).

As Bream

argument supporting the claim
transaction

is

the

that is not

explains, if a party seeks an

attorney fees under Section 12-120(3) “on the ground that the case

commercial transaction, the party should,

0n appeal

(“We have

is

award of

an action t0 recover in a

to the extent necessary, provide facts, authority,

that the case involves a

gravamen of the lawsuit.” Id.

at

and

‘commercial transaction’ and that such

369-70, 79 P.3d at 728-29. The Salvadors do

not identify facts 0r argument t0 support a “commercial transaction.” Salvadors Br. at 37-39.

T0 be
request

sure, they

do not even identify any commercial transaction

— Whether the purchase and

sale

that gives raise t0 their

0f Off—Spec or their post-sale employment — other than
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to say that they “are entitled to their attorney fees

because

from a

this action arises

commercial transaction under Idaho Code

§ 12-120(3), despite the fact that the

governed by California law.”

(The Salvadors d0 not mention the

when

Id. at 37-38.

discussing Section 12-120(3). See

adequate

facts,

id.)

That

is

MIPA is

LLC Agreement

not enough. Having failed t0 provide

argument, 0r authority that a claim involves a commercial transaction, the

Salvadors are not entitled t0 an award 0f fees under the statute. See Bream, 139 Idaho at 369-70,

79 P.3d

at

728-29; see also Houston

v.

Whittier, 147 Idaho 900, 912,

216 P.3d 1272, 1284 (2009)

(Houston) (declining t0 award fees under Section 12-120(3) because the defendant did not
“p0int[] to anything in the record indicating that action is Within the statutory deﬁnition 0f a

commercial transaction”).
b.

California law, not Idaho law, governs the

award of attorney

fees,

and

the Salvadors did not seek fees under California law.

T0

the extent the Salvadors seek attorney fees based

MIPA being the

0n the

transaction,” Section 12-120(3) does not apply t0 this action; California

“commercial

law does. But the

Salvadors cite no California statute or other authority supporting an award of attorney fees.

uncontested that the parties agreed that California law governs the
Spec. See R. 283-84 (§ 13.2(b)), 288 (§ 13.14).

law applies
Carroll

v.

to procedural matters,

MBNA Am.

and the other

MIPA and purchase 0f Off-

When a choice-of-law clause
state’s

law governs

all

is

Thus, the Court “must determine Whether the award 0f attorney fees

which

state’s

law applies.”
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Id. at

in play, Idaho

substantive matters.

Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 267, 220 P.3d 1080, 1086 (2009)

substantive in order to establish

It is

is

(Ml).
procedural 0r

270, 220 P.3d at 1089. The

award of attorney

fees is considered procedural if it

is

a discretionary matter governed by statute,

“while a statute providing for a mandatory award of attorney fees t0 the prevailing party
substantive.” Houston, 147 Idaho at 91

216 P.3d

1,

at

1283. That

means

the Court

is

must apply

California law, not Idaho law.

California Civil

Code

§

1717(a) states:

In any action

on a

where the contract speciﬁcally
which are incurred t0
Shall be awarded either t0 one 0fthe parties
contract,

provides that attorney ’sfees and
enforce that contract,

0r

t0 the prevailing party,

the party prevailing

0n the

costs,

Who

then the party
contract,

is

determined to be

Whether he or she is the party
t0 reasonable

speciﬁed in the contract or not, shall be entitled
attorney ’sfees in addition to other costs.

(Emphases added.) The

MIPA speciﬁcally provides that “the prevailing Party shall be entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees” in any action necessary t0 enforce
California Civil

Code

1717(a)

§

choice 0f California law. Idaho

See Carroll, 148 Idaho
the attorney fee

award

at

is

is

substantive law that

Code

§ 12-120(3),

its

terms. R.

284

(§ 13.7).

must be applied here given the

which

is

Thus

parties’

also substantive law, does not apply.

270, 220 P.3d at 1089 (noting that the court must determine whether

procedural 0r substantive

When determining Whether to award

fees

under Section 12-120(3)).

And that leads t0

the Salvadors’ failure t0 request attorney fees under California law,

including California Civil

entitled to attorney fees

Code

§ 1717(a),

and the waiver 0f their right

to

d0

so.

Again, t0 be

on appeal, the Salvadors must provide argument and authority

establishing a right t0 fees. That includes the statute and even the speciﬁc subsection of the

statute

upon Which

the party relies.

Bream, 139 Idaho
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at

369, 79 P.3d at 728. Because the

Salvadors

fail to assert

the speciﬁc statute, rule, 0r case authority

—

or any argument

claim under governing California law, the Court cannot consider the request. See

The Salvadors’

for

its

id.

on Ward v. Puregro C0., 128 Idaho 366, 370, 913 P.2d 582, 586

reliance

(M) does not change

(1996)

—

that analysis.

The Salvadors

cite

Ward for the

proposition that

Section 12-120(3) applies as Idaho “substantial policy,” even though the underlying merits 0f the
case were resolved under California law. Salvadors Br. at 38-39. Although
fees under Section 12-120(3),

an award of attorney
statute

fees.

it

attorney

does not address the application of the parties’ choice 0f law t0

See 128 Idaho

Without any indication that

it

at

370, 913 P.2d at 586.

The Court simply applied

the

considered Which states’ law controlled or that the parties

asserted California law controlled the fee issue. See

Ward is

Ward grants

id.

not authority on an issue that was never actually decided. See Fuller

v.

Walters,

119 Idaho 415, 425, 807 P.2d 633, 643 (1991) (holding that a previous decision assuming a
malpractice action

was a commercial

transaction for the purpose 0f awarding attorney fees

not binding because the Court in that case was “not asked

t0 decide

was

Whether a malpractice

action involving a commercial transaction falls within the parameters 0f [the statute]”), overruled

0n other grounds by Blimka
In other words,

See

id.;

Ward is

v.

My Web

Wholesaler,

LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594

(2007).

not authority for propositions not considered and should be disregarded.

see also Silverbrand

v.

County ofLos Angeles, 205 P.3d 1047, 1060

(Cal.

2009)

(“It is

axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (citation omitted».
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c.

Even

if the

Even

if

party

is

premature.

Court determines that Section 12-120(3) applies notwithstanding the

California choice of law,

awarded fees under the
fees

Section 12-120(3) applies, the determination 0f the prevailing

it

need not award attorney fees

at this time.

statute in certain appeals, including in

Ward,

on appeal when the prevailing party has not been determined.

Place/Idaho Water

award

fees

Ctr. Project,

Although the Court has
it

has also declined to award

See, e.g., In re Univ.

146 Idaho 527, 546, 199 P.3d 102, 121 (2008) (declining t0

0n appeal under Section 12-120(3) because “[a]lthough [one party] prevailed on

remains to be determined whether

it

0r the [other party] will ultimately be the

prevailing party in this litigation”); Minnick

v.

Hawley

appeal,

it

Troxell Ennis

& Hawley, LLP,

this

157 Idaho

863, 868, 341 P.3d 580, 585 (2015) (declining t0 award fees 0n appeal under Section 12-120(3)

because “any determination of the prevailing party
(citation omitted»;

Lexington Heights Dev.,

LLC v.

is

premature until the case

is

ﬁnally resolved”

Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 P.3d

526, 537 (2004) (declining to award attorney fees 0n appeal under Section 12-120(3) because the
“the district court has not yet determined whether they are prevailing parties in this lawsuit”).

Ward, in contrast, resolved “the underlying merits of the case” and “the substantive
issue.” 128 Idaho at 370,

4.

913 P.2d

at

586. That

is

not the situation here.

This appeal has nothing t0 d0 With the Idaho

The Salvadors

also request attorney fees

Wage Claim Act.

on appeal pursuant

Salvadors Br. 39-40. There are at least two reasons

statute.
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Why they

t0 Idaho’s

Wage Claim Act.

are not entitled to fees under this

First, this appeal

does not concern the Idaho

Wage Claim Act.

There

is

no dispute

that

employment-related claims arising under the Salvadors’ Employment Agreements should be
arbitrated in Idaho,

Where Off—Spec demanded

arbitration.

That issue has been decided and

is

ﬁnal. See R. 871-74. Likewise, any counterclaims 0r crossclaims that the Salvadors choose to

bring under the Idaho

appeal

is

the

Wage Claim Act

forum selection

should be decided in Idaho.

for disputes under the

What is

at issue in this

MIPA and the LLC Agreement

— nothing

about wages or employment.

Second, Idaho Code § 45-615(2) provides for attorney fees and costs for “[a]nyjudgment
rendered by a court 0f competent jurisdiction for the plaintiff in a suit ﬁled pursuant to this
section.”

is

(Emphasis added.)

No

“judgment” will be awarded in

Whether the forum selection under the

“it

cannot yet be determined

the Court cannot

Who

award attorney

plaintiff prevailed

MIPA and the LLC Agreement is

Will be the prevailing party”

fees at this time. See

417 P.3d 234, 240 (2018) (declining
0n appeal because

to

Savage

only issue

enforceable. Because

0n the Salvadors’ wage claims,

v.

Scandit Ina, 163 Idaho 637, 643,

award attorney fees under Section 45-615(2) even though

“it

party in the action”); see also Nettleton

this appeal; again, the

cannot yet be determined

v.

Who

Will be the prevailing

Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC, 163 Idaho

70, 75,

408

P.3d 68, 73 (2017) (same).
5.

Attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 are not warranted because
Appellants have raised serious and legitimate legal issues on a novel issue.

Finally, the Salvadors request attorney fees

under Idaho Code

§ 12-121. Salvadors Br.

40-41. That statute allows an award 0f attorney fees if the Court ﬁnds an appeal
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was brought or

pursued frivolously, unreasonably, 0r without foundation. Clark

v.

Jones Gledhill Fuhrman

Gourzey, P.A., 163 Idaho 215, 229—30, 409 P.3d 795, 809—10 (2017) (Clark).

No

such

circumstances exist here. Appellants have raised serious and legitimate legal issues 0n an issue

0f ﬁrst impression before

this Court:

whether California law requires consideration of Idaho

public policy to determine Whether a California forum selection clause

This

is

is

enforceable.

not “a frivolous, unreasonable, 0r unfounded appeal.” See Fell

L.L.C., 167 Idaho 34,

467 P.3d 398, 406 (2020) (declining

to

v.

Fat Smitty ’s

award attorney fees

t0 appellants,

even though they were not the prevailing party 0n appeal, because they “raised unique issues”

and had a reasonable basis for the appeal). “[F]ees Will generally not be awarded When good
faith

arguments are made on appeal.” Clark, 163 Idaho

T3, the Court declined to

at

230, 409 P.3d at 810. For example in

award attorney fees on appeal under Section 12-121 When the issue was

novel and the appellant provided cogent argument and authority. See 164 Idaho
at 539.

The same

Even

is

so, the

at

759, 435 P.3d

true here.

Salvadors argue that attorney fees are appropriate because 0f “the Investors”

unreasonable litigation tactics,” again conﬂating the distinct entities that demanded arbitration in
California and Idaho, based on different misconduct and covered

by

different contracts.

Salvadors Br. 40-41. Again, Off—Spec, not Appellants, sought arbitration in Idaho under the

Employment Agreements. Appellants were brought
application, have not sought to delay the case,

in

H20 Environmental,

Inc.

v.

into Idaho

under the Salvadors’ cross-

and have certainly not caused a four-year delay as

Farm Supply Distributors, Ina, 164 Idaho
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295, 429 P.3d 183

(2018). Appellants are simply trying t0 enforce their agreements under the

Agreement

t0 arbitrate disputes in California, as California

IV.

For the reasons

remand With

set forth

instructions t0

MIPA and the LLC

law requires.

CONCLUSION

above, Appellants ask the Court t0 reverse the district court and

deny the Salvadors’ cross—application and enter an order granting

Appellants’ motion to dismiss and compelling arbitration of claims arising under the

the

LLC Agreement t0 take place in

MIPA and

Sacramento County, California, pursuant to the forum

selection provisions in those agreements.

DATED: December

1,

2020.
Respectfully submitted,

STOEL RIVES

W.

LLP

Christopher Pooser

Nicole C. Hancock

W.

Christopher Pooser

Jennifer S. Palmer

Attorneys for Appellants/Cross—Respondents

37

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY that on December 1, 2020, I served a true and correct copy
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF upon the following

of the Within and foregoing

named parties by the method
Dane A.

indicated below, and addressed t0 the following:

_
_
_

Bolinger, ISB N0. 9104

Lars E. Lundberg, ISB No. 9993

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, ID 83701-1617

_X_

Hand

delivered

U.S. mail

Via email
Via iCourt eﬁle

& serve at:

dbolinger@hawleytr0xell.com
llundberg@hawleytroxell.com

W.

Christopher Pooser

Nicole C. Hancock

W.

Christopher Pooser

Jennifer S. Palmer

38

